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No. 73-362
MORTON (Secretary of the
Interior)

v.

~ from THREE-JUDGE
~D N. Mexico
(Seth, Bratton, Meechem,
memorandum)

MA NCA Rl (Employee of BIA non- Indian)

Timely

No. 73-364
AMERID (Intervenor Appellant)

v.

Appeal from THREE-JUDGE
USDC D N. Mexico
(Seth, Bratton, Meechem,
memorandum)

MANCARI (Employee of BIA non-Indian)

1.
judgm~nt

Timely

This is a direct appeal brought under 28 U.S. C. 1253 from a
of a three judge court.

ees

Appell ~

challenged,

on ~

constitutional

..
- 2 -

-

and statutory gJOunds, the Congressional enactments giving Indians preference
for employment in the BIA.

The court found that the Acts were implicity

repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and granted
relief on that ground without reaching the constitutional question.

The

Secretary and an intervenor, a non-profit organization representing the
Indian employees, appeal.

FACTS: Appellees, employees of the .BIA with less than 25%

2.

Indian blood, brought this class action in .the USDC D Arizona seeking an
injunction against the operation of the Indian Preference statutes, 25

u.s.c.

44-46, 472.

by the BIA.

The Plaintiffs are teachers and programers employed

They testified as to particular training and advancement

opportunities which they claim were denied them because they were not
eligible for the statutory preference.

They attacked:

(1)

the construction

of these statutes employed by the Secretary under which he gave a preference
to persons of Indian blood in initial hiring, training and promotion; (2) - the
continued vitality of these acts in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1972;
(3) - the constitutionality of these acts under the due process clause of the

---

Fifth Amendment.

The court declined to pass on the exact scope of the

preferential treatment mandated by the statutes (See.

.

CADC - unreported - in intervenors appx. ).

Freeman v. Morton

Instead, it held that the

statutes had been tacitly repealed by the Equal Employment law and that,
un~ r

-

..

.

that law, the preferences were

ille ~ al.

The court did not pass on the

constitutional objections to the statute but did note that ' ' Under these
circumstances, we could well hold that the statute must fail on constitutional
grounds, but instead we hold as above described that the preference statutes
must give way to the Civil Rights Act."

- 3 Justice Marshall has stayed the injunction pending final action by this Court.
3.

CONTENTIONS: Appellant argues that the question is substantial

---

since the preference statutes provide jobs for the Tribal Indians, and ensure
that governmental relations with the Tribes through the BIA and the field will
be "informed by the special sensitivity which those who belong to the
beneficiary-minority can bring to the federal Indian program.''

The

//government argues that nothing in the Equal Employment Act indicates repeal
~ of the Indian Preference acts and that no conflict should be expected since

both have the same basic end -- the protection of minority employment.

The

SG also argues that the preferences do not violate any constitutional mandate.
The preferences are availabl_e only to members of Tribes whose affairs are
administered by BIA and, therefore, argues the SG, the statutes are not
strictly racial legislation.

Additionally, he argues, the Indian Commerce

Clause of the Constitution recognizes the Indian tribes as separate nations
dependent upon the U.S. and justifies special laws granting the Indians
special privileges not available to the entire population.
The intervenor in No. 73-364 makes essentially the same argumerts
d--

as the SG.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The question is an important one to the administra-

I

tion of the BIA ald one not clearly decided correctly by the CA.

The

argument ~

of the SG on the interpretation of the statutes are not easily dismissed.

Befor e:

acting on the case, ho-w ever, a response should be requested from the
appellees.

This should shed additional light on the jurisdictional question

and the strene;th of the SG' s statutory analysis.
There is no response.
Ripple

11/7/73

Op USDC in petn appx.

No. 73-364

~~om

THREE-JUDGE
Mexico
(Seth, Bratton, Meechem,
memorandum)

AMERID (Intervenor Appellant}

~N.

v.
MA NCARI (Employee of BIA non-Indian)

Timely

See Preliminary Memo for No. 73-362.
Ripple
11/7/73

PW

/

t

December 20, 1973

Response Re~ed

No. 73-362
Morton (Sec. of Interior) v. Mancari
The response adds nothing.
reverse, without oral argument.

I think I would summarily
One or . . two Justices may,

however, want to hear the case to try to reach the question of
the constitutionality of ben~treatment of racial minorities.
E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard,No. 73-235 (Washington law school
compensatory admissions policy case).

Although the USDC tipped

its hand as to how it would decide this constitutional question,
. . it in fact did not decide it.
is not before the Court.

~----------~~~

~s,

without

Thus,

~

constitutional issue

I would reverse on the basis of the

holding~for

DeFunis.
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Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 7 3-36 2
(Vide 73-364)

ROGERS C. B. MORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL., Appellants
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C. R. MANCARI, ET AL.
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73-362

AND

73-364

Rogers, C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeals from the
73-362
v.
United States District
C. R. Mancari et al.
Court for the District of
New Mexico.
Amerind, Appellant,
73-364
v.
C. R. Mancari et al.
![June - , 19741
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 accords an
employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] . Appellees, non-Indian
BIA employees, challenged this preference as contrary
to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and as violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A
three-judge federal district court concluded that the Indian preference under the 1934 Act was impliedly repealed by the 1972 Act. Mancari v. Morton, 359 F .
Supp. 585 (N. M. 1973). We noted probable jurisdiction in order to examine the statutory and constitutional
validity of this longstanding Indian preference. 414
u.. - (1974).

...
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I
Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act, also
known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 986 (1934),
25 U.S. C.§ 472, provides:
"The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may
be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws,
to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office/ in the administration of
functions or services affecting any Indian tribe.
Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such
positions." 2
In June 1972, pursuant to this provision, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, issued a directive (Personnel Management Letter No. 72-12) stating that the BIA's
policy would be to grant a preference to qualified Indians
not only, as before, in the initial hiring sta.ge, but also
in the situation where an Indian and a non-Indian, both
already employed by the BIA, were competing for a promotion within the Bureau. 3 The record indicates that
this policy was implemented immediately.
1
The Indian Health Service was transferred in 1954 from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. Act of August 5, 1954, § 1, 68 Stat. 674, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2001. Presumably, despite this transfer, the reference in § 12 to the
"Indian Office" has continuing application to the Indian Health
Service.
2
There are earlier and more narrowly drawn Indian preference
statutes. 25 U. S. C. §§ 44, 45,. 46, 47, and 274. For all practical
purposes, these were replaced by the broader preference of § 12.
Although not directly challrnged in this litigation, these statutes,
under the District Court's deciswn, clearly would be invalidated.
[Footnote 3 is on p. 3]

'73-362 & 73-364-0PINION
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3

Shortly thereafter, appellees, who are non-Indian employees of the BIA at Albuquerque; instituted this class
action, on behalf of themselves and other non-Indian
employees similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming that
the "so-called 'Indian Preference Statutes' " were repealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act
·and deprived them of rights to property without due
process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendtnent. 5
Named as defendants were the Secretary of the Interior1
3

The directive stated:
"The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 23, 1972]
he has approved the Bureau's policy to extend Indian preference to
training and to filling vacancies by original appointment, reinstatement, and promotion. The new policy was discussed with the national president of the N a tiona! Federation of Federal Employees
under national consultation rights NFFE has with the Department.
Secretary Morton and I jointly stress that careful attention must
be given to protecting the rights of non-Indian employees. The new
policy provides as follows: Where two or more candidates who meet
the established qualification requirements are available for filling a
vacancy, if one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in
filling the vacancy. This new policy is effective immediately and is
incorporated into all existing programs such as the promotion program. Revised manual releases will be issued promptly for review
and comment. You should take immediate steps to notify all
employees and recognized unions of this policy."
4 The appellees state that none of them is employed on or near an
Indian reservation. Brief for Appellees 8. The District Court
described the appellees as "teachers .. . or programmers, or in computer work." Mancari v. Morton, 359 F . Supp. 585, 587 (N . M.
1973) .
5 The specific question whether § 12 of the 1934 Act authorizes a
preference in promotion as well as in initial hiring was not decided
by the District Court and is not now before us. We express no
U. S. App,
opinion on this issue. See Freeman v. Morton, D . C . - , - F . 2 d - (1974) . See also Mescalero Apache Tnbe
. v. Hickel, .432 F. 2d 956 (CAlO 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 981
(1971) · (preference held inapplicable to reduction in force) .

73-362 & 73-364-0PINION
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the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the BIA Directors for the Albuquerque and Navajo Area Offices.
Appellees claimed that implementation and enforcement
of the new preference policy "placed and will continue to
place [appellees] at a distinct disadvantage in competing
for promotion and training programs with Indian employees, all of which has and will continue to subject the
[appellees] to discrimination and deny them equal em~
ployment opportunity.''
A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 2282 because the complaint sought to enjoin,
as unconstitutional, the enforcement of a federal statute.
Appellant Amerind, a nonprofit organization representing
Indian employees of the BIA, moved to intervene in
support of the preference; this motion was granted by
the District Court and Amerind thereafter participated
at all stages of this litigation,
After a short trial focusing primarily on how the new
1
policy, in fact, has been implemented, the District Court
concluded that the Indian preference was implicitly repealed by § 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. ll1, 42 U. S. C.
(Supp. II 1973) § 2000e-16 (a), proscribing discrimination in most federal employment on the basis of race. 6
Section 2000e-16 (a) rrads :
"All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits
of the United States) in military departments as defined in section
102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal
Rate Commissioner, in those units of the Government of the DistricL
of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those
units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library
6

.

'
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Having found that Congress repealed the preference, it
was unnecessary for the District Court to pass on its
constitutionality. The court permanently enjoined appellants "from implementing any policy in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs which would hire, promote, or reassign
any person in preference to another solely for the reason
that such person is an Indian." The execution and ~n~
forcement of the judgment of the District Court was
stayed by MR. JusTICE MARSHALL on August 16, 1973;
pending the disposition of this appeal.

II
The federal policy of according some hiring preference ~
to Indians in the Indian service dates at least as far back
as 1834. 7 Since that time, Congress repeatedly has en?-Cted variOUS preferences of the general type here at
issue. 8 The purpose of these preferences, as variously
expressed in the legislative history, has been to give Ini:lians a greater participation m their own selfof Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
7 Act of June 30, 1834, § 9, 4 Stat. 737, 25 U. S. C. § 45 :
"In all cases of the appointments of interpreters or other per~on::;
employed for the benefit of the Indians, a preference shall be given
to persons of Indian descent, if such can be found, who arc properly
qualified for the execution of the duties."
8 Act of May 17, 1882, § 6, 22 Stat. 88, and Act of July 4, 1884
1
§ 6, 23 Stat. 97, 25 U.S. C.§ 46 (employment of clerical, mechanical,
and other help on reservations and about agencies); Act of August 15,
1894, § 10, 28 Stat. 313, 25 U. S. C. § 44 (employment of herder::;,
teamsters, and laborers, "and where practicable in all other employments" in the Indian service) ; Act of June 7, 1897, § 1, 30 Stat.
83, 25 U. S. C. § 274 (employment as matrons, farmers, and industrial teachers in Indian schools) ; Act of June 25, 1910, § 23, 36
Stat. 861, 25 U. S. C. § 47 (general preference as to Indian labor and
iJroducts of Indian industry).

73-362 & 73-364-0PINION
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government; 9 to further the Government's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; 10 and to reduce the negative eft'ect of having non-Indians administer matters
that afi'ect Indian triballife. 11
The preference directly at issue here was enacted as
an important part of the sweeping Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934. The overriding purpose of that particular
Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes
would be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically. 12 Congress was
9
Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the 1934 Act, explained the need
for a preference as follows:
"We are setting up in the United States a civil service rule which
prevents Indians from managing their own property. It is an entirely different service from anything else in the United States because these Indians own this property. It belongs to them. What
this policy of this Government is and what it should be is to teach
these Indians to manage their own business and control their own
funds and to administer their own property, and the civil service
has worked very poorly so far as the Indian Service is concerned ... ."
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 2755
and S. 3645 (Part 2), 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 256 (1934).
10 A letter, contained in the House Report to the 1934 Act, from
President F. D. Roosevelt to Congressman Howard states:
"We can and should, without further delay, extend to the Indian
the fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-government
and the opportunities of education and economic assistance that they
require in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is but
the obligation of honor of a powerful nation toward a people living
among u;; and dependent upon our protection." H. R. Rep. No. 1804,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 ( 1934).
11 "If the Indians are exposed to any danger, there is none greater
than the residence among them of unprincipled white men." H. R.
Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 98 (1834) (letter dated
February 10, 1834, from Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of
War .
12 As explained by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
"[T] his bill is designed not to prevent the absorption of Indians in
white communities 1 but rather to provide for those Indians unwilling

.•'

..

.

.,.

..
'·,.

'·

..
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seeking to modify the then-existing situation whereby
the primarily non-Indian-staffed BIA had plenary control, for all practical purposes, over the lives and destinies
of the federally recognized Indian tribes. Initial congressional proposals would have diminished substantially
the role of the BIA by turning over to fed€rally chartered
self-governing Indian communities many bf the functions normally performed by the Bureau.' 3 Committe€
sentiment, however, ran against such a radical change
in the role of the BIA. 14 The solution ultimately
adopted was to strengthen tribal government while con,.
tinuing the active role of the BIA, with the understanding that the Bureau would be more responsive to the
interests of the people it was created to serve.
One of the primary means by which self-government
would be fostered and the Bureau made more responsive
was to increase the participation of tribal Indians in
the BIA operations. 15 In order to achieve this end, it
was recognized that some kind of preference and exemption from otherwise prevailing civil service requirements
or unable to compete in the white world some measures of self-government in their own affairs." Hearings on S. 2755 before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs (Part 1), 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1934).
13
Hearings before the House Committee on Indian Affairs on
H. R. 7902, Readjustment of Indian Affairs, 73d Cong.,, 2d Sess., 1-7
1934 [House Hearings]. See also Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U. S. 145, 152-153, fn. 9 (1973).
14 House Hearings 491-497.
15 "[Section 12] was intended to integrate the Indian into the
government service connected with the administration of his affairs . Congress was anxious to promote economic and political self,determination for the Indian" (footnote omitted). Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F. 2d :956, 960 (CAIO 1970), cert.
·denied, ·401 U. S. 981 (1971').
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was 11ecessary.1 r.
Congressman Howard, the House
sponsor, expressed the need for the preference:
"The Indians have not only been thus deprived
of civic rights and powers, but they have been largely
deprived of the opportunity to enter the more important positions in the service of the very bureau
which manages their affairs. Theoretically, the Indians have the right to qualify for the Federal civil
service. In actual practice there has been no adequate program of training to qualify Indians to
compete in these examinations, especially for technical and higher positions; and even if there were
such training, the Indians would have to compete
under existing law, on equal terms with multitudes
of white applicants . . . . The various services on
the Indian reservations are actually local rather
than Federal services and are comparable to local
municipal and county services, since they are dealing with purely local Indian problems. It should
be possible for Indians with the requisite vocational
and professional training to enter the service of their
own people without the necessity of competing with
white applicants for these positions. This bill permits them to do so," 78 Cong. Rec. 11729 (1934),

..

,,
I.

Congress was well aware that the proposed preference
would result in employment disadvantages within the
"The bill admits qualified Indians to the position [~ic] in their
own service.
"Thirty-four years ago, in 1900, the number of Indians holding
regular positions in the Indian Service, in proportion to the total of
positions, was greater than it is today.
"The reason primarily is found in the application of the genrrahzed
civil service to the Indian Service, and the consequent exclusion of
Indian::; from their own jobs." House Hearings 19 (Memorandum
dated February 19, 1934, submitted by Commissioner Collier to the
·Senate and Hopse Committees on Indian Affairs) .
•

16

...

73-362 & 73-364-0PINION
MORTON v. MANCARI

9

BIA for non-Indians.' 7 Not only was this displacement
unavoidable if room were to be made for Indians, but it
was explicitly determined that gradual replacement of
non-Indians with Indians within the Bureau was a desirable feature of the entire program for self-government.18 Since 1934, the BIA has implemented the prefereiiCe with a fair degree of success. The percentage of
Indians employed in the Bureau rose from 34o/o in 1934
to 57% in 1972. This reversed the former downward
trend, see n. 16. supra, and was due, clearly, to the presence of the 1934 Act. The Commissioner's extension
of the preference in 1972 to promotio11s within the BIA
was designed to bring more Indians into positions of responsibility and, in that regard, appears to be a logical
extension of the congressional intent. See Freeman V.
Morton, supra, and n. 5, supra ..

III
It is against this background that we encounter the
first issue in the present case: whether the Indian preference was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972~ Title· VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, was the first major piece of federal
1
' Rep. Carter, an opponent of the bill, placed in the Congressional
Record the following obHervation by Commissioner Collier at the
Committee Hearings:
"[W]e muHt not blind ourselves to the fact that the effect of this bill
if worked out would unquestionably be to replace white employees by
Indian employees. I do not know how fast, but ultimately it ought
to go very far indeed." 78 Cong. Rec. 11737 ( 1934).
18
"It should be possible for Indians to enter the service of their
own people without running the gauntlet of competition with whites
for these positions. Indian progress and ambition will be enormously
strengthened as soon as we adopt the principle that the Indian
Service shall gradually become, in fact as well as in name, an Indial'l
service predominantly in the hands of educated and competent
IndianA ." 78 Cong. Rec . 11731 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard) ,.
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legislation prohibiting discrimination in private employ~
ment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U. S. C. § 20000e-2 (a). Significantly,
§§ 701 (b) and 703 (i) of that Act explicitly exempted
from its coverage the preferential employment of Indians
by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near Indian reservations. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e (b) and 2000e2 (i) .10 This exemption reveals a clear congressional
recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the
unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities. The Senate sponsor, Senator Humphrey, stated on
the floor by way of explanation:
"This exemption is consistent with the Federal
Government's policy of encouraging Indian employment and with the special legal position of Indians." 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). 20
The 1964 Act did not specifically outlaw employment
discrimination by the federal government. 21 Yet the
10 Section 2000e (b) excludes "an Indian Tribe" from the Act's
definition of "employer." Section 2000e-2 (i) states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business
or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect, to any
publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual
because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation."
20 Senator Mundt supported these exemptions on the Senate floor
by claiming that they would allow Indians "to benefit from Indian
preference programs now in operation or later to be instituted."
110 Cong. Rec. 13702 (1964) .
21 The 1964 Act, however, did contain a proviso, expressed in some~
what precatory language :
"That it shall be the policy of the United States to insure equal
employment opportunjties for Federal employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 78
Stat. 254,
This statement of policy was reenacted as 5 U. S. C. § 7151, 80 Stat,
523 (1966), and the 1964 Act's proviso was repealed, id., at 662,

,,

'.
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mechanism for enforcing long-outstanding Executive
Orders forbidding government discrimination had proved
ineffective for the most part. 22 In order to remedy this,
Congress, by the 1972 Act, amended the 1964 Act and
proscribed discrimination in most areas of federal government. See n. 6, supra. In general, it may be said
that the substantive anti-discrimination law embraced
in '@:e VII was carried over and applied to the Federal
Government. As stated in the House Report;
"To correct this entrenched discrimination in th~
Federal service, it is necessary to insure th~ effec•
tive application of uniform, fair and stron~ly en•
forced policies. The present law and the proposed
statute do not permit industry and labor organizations to be the judges of their own conduct in the
area of employment discrimination; There is no
reason why government agencies should not be
treated similarly." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H. R.
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1971).
Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1972 Act, however, is there any mention of Indian preference.
Appellees assert, and the District Court held, that
since the 1972 Act proscribed racial discrimination in
government employment, the Act necessarily, albeit sub
silentio, repealed the provision of the 1934 Act, that
22

"This disproportionatte [sic] distribution of minorities and
women throughout the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from
higher level policy-making and supervisory positions indicates the
government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity.
"A critical defect of the Federal equal employment program has
been the failure of the complaint process. That process has impeded rather than advanced the goal of the elimination of discrimination in Federal employment." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H . R,
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24 (1911) .
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called for the preference in the BIA of one racial group,
Indians, over non-Indians:
"When a conflict such as in this case, is present,
the most reoent law or Act should apply and the
conflicting Preferences passed some 39 years earlier
should be impliedly repealed." Brief for Appellee&

7o
We disagree, For several r!;)asons we conclude that
Congress did not intend to repeal the Inqian :prefereno~
;:too that The 'DJ.strict Court erred in holding that it was
repealed .
.First: There are the abqv!;)-mentioned affirmative :provisions in the 1964 Act excluding covera~e of tribal employment and of preferential treatment by a business or
enterprise on or near a reservation. 4~ u. s. c.
§§ 2000e (b) and :2000e-~ (i). See n, 19, supra. These
1964 exemptions as to private employment indicate Con ..
gress' recognition of the longstanding federal policy of
providing a unique legal status to Indians ip mattel;'1?
concerning tribal or "on or near" reservation employment. The exemptions reveal a clear congressional sei1timent that an Indian preference in the narrow conte:ll;t
of tribal or reservation-related employment did not
constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise
proscribed. In extending the general anti-discrimination
machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in
no way modified these private employment preferences
built into the 1964 Act, and they are still in effect. It
would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended
to eliminate the longstanding statutory preferences in
BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory, at the
very same time it was reaffirming the right of tribal and
reservation-related private employers to provide Indian
preference. Appellees' assertion that Congress implicitly
repealed the preference as racially discriminatory, while

•.

·.

'

•.

'
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retaining the 1964 preferences, attributes to Congress
irrationality and arbitrariness, an attribution we do not
share.
Second: Three months after Congress passed the 1972
amendments, it enacted two new Indian preference laws.
These were part of the Education Amendments of 1972,
86 Stat. 235, 20 U. S. C. (Supp. II 1973) §§ 887c (a)
and (d), and § 1119a. The new laws explicitly require
that Indians be given preference in government programs
for training teachers of Indian children, It is improbable, to say the least, that the same Congress which affir•
matively approved and enacted these additional and
similar Indian preferences was, at the same time, con•
demning the BIA preference as racially discriminatory.
In the total absence of any manifestation of supportive
intent, we are loathe to imply this improbable result.
Third: Indian preferences, for many years, have been
treated as exceptions to Executive Orders forbidding
government employment discrimination. 2 :J The 1972 extension of the Civil Rights Act to government employment is in large part merely a codification of prior antidiscrimination Executive Orders that had proved ineffective because of inadequate enforcement machinery.
There certainly was no indication that the substantive
23
Sec. e. g., Ex. Order 7423, .July 26, 1936, 1 Fed. Reg. 885-886,
When President Eisenhower issued an Order prohibiting discrimina~
tion on the basis of race in the civil service, Exec. Order 1057.7,
No 22, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, § 4.2, he left standing earlier Executtve Orders containing exceptions for the Indian service. I d., § 301,
Src also 5 CFR § 213.3112 (a) (7) (1974), which provides a civil
~crvice exemption for :
''All positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other positions
in the Department of the Interior directly and primarily related to
the providing of services to Indians when filled by the appointment of
Indian:; who are one-fourth or more Indian blood."
See al:;o ·5 1CF-R § 213.3116 (b)(8) (1~74) (Indian Health Services),
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proscription against discrimination was intended to be
any broader than that which previously existed. By
codifying the existing anti-discrimination provisions, and
by providing enforcement machinery for them, there
is no reason to presume that Congress affirmatively intended to erase the preferences that previously had coexisted with broad anti-discrimination provisiOns m
Executive Orders.
Fourth: Appellees encounter head-on the "cardinal
rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored."
Posedas v. 1\·ational City Ba:nk, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1963);
Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342-343, 363 (1842);
Universal Interpretative Shuttle Corp. v. Washington
M etropolttan Area Tra·nsit Comm'n, 393 U. S. 186, 193
( 1968). Th and the District Court read the congresSIOnal silence as ffectuating a repeal by implication.
There is nothing in the legislative history, however, that
indicates affirmatively any congressional intent to repeal
the 1934 preference. Indeed, as explained above, there
is ample independent evidence that the legislative intent
was to the contrary.
This is a prototypical case where an adjudication of
repeal by implication is not appropriate. The preference is a longstanding, important component of the
Government's Indian program. The anti-discrimination
provision, aimed at alleviating minority discrimination
in employment, obviously is designed to deal with an
entirely different and. indeed, opposite problem. Any
perceived conflict is thus more apparent than real.
Iu the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a
repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
324 U. S. 439, 456-457 (1945). Clearly, this is not the
case here. A provision aimed at furthering Indian self-

i

..
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government by according an employment preference
within the BIA for qualified members of the governed
group can readily co-exist with a general rule prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of race. Any
other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores both the history and purposes of the
preference and the unique legal relationship between the
Federal Government and tribal Indians.
Furthermore, the Indian preference sta.tute is a specific provision applying to a very specific situation. The
1972 Act, on the other hand, is of general application.
Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific
statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e. g.,
Bulova liT' atch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758
(1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83, 87-89
(1902) .
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among \
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective. "When there are
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect
to both if possible . . . . The intention of the legislature
to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.' " United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939). Moreover,
even if there were a doubt, it. is well established that
legislative ambiguities touching on the Government's
role as guardian of Indian tribes "are to be resolved in
favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards
of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection
and good faith " Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675
(1912); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 582 (1832);
United States v Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 290 ( 1909);
Squire \'. Capoernan, 351 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1956); McClana-
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han v Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174
(1973) . In light of the factors indicating no repeal, we
simply caunot conclude that Congress consciously abandoned its policy of furthering Indian self-government
when it passed the 1972 amendments.
We therefore hold that the District Court erred in
holding that the Indian preference was repealed by the
1972 Act.

IV

I

We still must decide whether, as the appellees contend,
the preference constitutes invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954).
The District Court, while pretermitting this issue, said,
" [ W] e could well hold that the statute must fail on constitutional grounds." 359 F. Supp., at 591.
Whatever may be the constitutional consequences of
a case of purely benign racial discrimination, cf. DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P. 2d 1169 (1973),
vacated as moot and remanded, U. S. (1974),
this is not such a ca:se, Resolution of the instant issue
turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress,
based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a
"guardian-ward" status, to legislate on behalf of federally
recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is
drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with
the power to "reg_ulateKCommerce ... with the Indian
Tribes,' ' and thus, to t 1s extent, singleslndians out aS' )~
a~· subject for separate legislation. Article II, § 2, V \
cl 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This
had been the source of the Government's power to deal
'

.
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with the ln<han tY.ibes. 'The Court has described the
origin and nature of the special relationship:
"In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the
United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their lauds, sometimes by force, leaving
them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people,
needing protection against the selfishness of others
and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the
United States assumed the duty of furnishing that
protection, and with it the authority to do all that
was required to perform that obligation and to
prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic."
Board of County Cornm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705,
715 (1943) .
See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383-384
(1886).
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian
tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title
of thr United States Code (25 U. S. C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized. See
Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n. 13
(ED Wash. 1965). aff'd, 384 U. S. 209 (1966).
It IS in this historical and legal context that the constitutional validity of the Indian preference is to be determined. As discussed above, Congress in 1934 determined that proper fulfillment of its trust required
turning over to the Indians a greater control of their
own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of

I
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prior yPars had proved both exploitative and destructive
of Indian lllt<'rests. Congress was united in the belief
that institutional changes were required. An importa11t
part of the Indian Rt>organization Act was the preferencE:'
provision lwrr at issue .
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees,
this preference docs not constitute "racial discrimina~
tion" Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preferencc. 21
Rather, it is an t>mploymcnt criterion reasonably deSigned to further the cause of Indian self-government
and to makP the BIA more responsive to the needs of
its constituent groups. It is directed to participation
by the governed in tlw governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosc11,"
"' Thr prPf<'rrnr<' •~ not dir!'rtrd toward~ a ··racwl" group ron~i~t
illp; of ··Indian,;"; in~trad, it applir::; onl~· to mrmbrr::; of "frdNally
reeop;mz<'d" t ribr;;. Thi~ opNntr~ to exrludr man~· inclividuab who
nrc• ra<·wll~· to h<• rla~~ifird a~ ·' Indian~. " In thi~ ~rn,;e, tlw prrfrrrncr •~ political rathrr than rarinl in naturr. Thr rligibility critrria
apprar in 4A BIA:\[ :~:~5, :u .
" l PoiiC~·-An Indian has prd<'r<'Jlrr 111 appomtmrnt 1ll thP Bu]"('<111.
To h<' elip;ibiP for prrfNPneP m appointmrnt, promotiOn, and
t raming, an mdividual mu~t hr onr-fourt h or morr drgn•<• 1ndian
blood and IJp a mPmhPr of '' Fedrrall~·-rpr<Jgmz('(l tnbr. It i~ thr
pohr~· for promotional <"OJJ~Hlf'l"atwn that whrrr two or man• cnnc!JdatP~ who nwrt thr <'~tab!J~hrd qualification rPquirrmrnt~ arp avalinhh• for filing :t vacant·~·. 1f onr of thrm 1~ an Indian, lw ~hall bt•
g;1vrn prdrrc•ncr 111 filling t hP vncanc~·. In arrordanc<• wit It t IH'
pohc~· ~tatrmPnt approwd h~· thr Srcn•tary, thr Commi~HionPr ma.\'
grant <'XCC']ltJOn~ to th1~ pohe~· by approving thr ~Pirrtion and apJlOlnlmPnt of non-lndwn~. whrn hr con~idPr~ It 111 thr br~t JntNr~t
of thr Bumtu
""Th1~ program do<·~ not rp,.;tnet t hr np;ht of managrm!'nt to fill
po~JtJon~ by mrthod~ othrr than through promotiOn.
Po~ition~ may
hr fillrd h~ , trnn~frr,;, rpa~~•p;nment, rrm~tatrmrnt, or initial
<lppomt mrnt " App 9:2
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.\rt. T. ~ 3. cl. 3, or that a m0mber of a city council reside
within tlw city governed by the council. Congress has
sought only to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from
among the constituent group in staffing its projects, all of
which. either directly or indirectly, affect the lives of
tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi~sovercign tribal entities whose lives
and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion . See n. 24, supra. In the sense that there is no
otlwr group of people favored in this manner, the legal
status of the BIA is truly sui geueris.t" Furthermore,
the preference applies only to employment in the Indian
service. The preference does not cover any other govC'rnment agency or activity, and wc need not consider the
obviously more difficult question that would be presented
by a blanket cx<>mption for I ndiaus from all civil service
Pxaminations. Here, the preference is reasonably and
dirf'ctly rf'lated to a legitimate. nonracially based goaL
This is the principal characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination .
On numerous occasions tbis Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular
and special treatment.
See, e. g., Board of County
Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943) (federally
granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Cornm'n, 411 r. S. 164 (1973) (same); Simmons' v.
Eagle Seelatsee, 384 r. S. 209 (1966), affirming, 244 F.
Supp. 808 (ED Wash. 1965) (statutory definition of
tribal membership. with resulting interest in trust
estatP). Williams r Lee, 358 l" S. 217 (1959) (tribal
~n

Re1wtor Whr<>ler det<cnbrd thr BIA a:; "an entirdy diffcrrnt
from an~·thinp; rlt<r in thr Unitrd State:;." Hearing:; brfore
thr. Senatr Commtttre on Indian Affair~ on S 2755 and S. :~645
( Part. :.n , i:{d C'ong ., 2d Sess., 256 (19;34) .
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<;ourts and their jurisdiction over reservation affairs) .
U. S . - (1974) (federal welCf. Morton v. Ruiz, fare benefits for Indians "on or near" reservations).
This unique legal status is of long standing, see Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 ( 1831) ; Worcester v. Georgia,
6 Pet. 515 ( 1832) , and its sources are diverse. See, generally, U. S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law
(19,58); Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 445 (1970). As long as the
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such
legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where
the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to
further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress' classification violates due process.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed

..

It is so ordered.
/
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